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How	is	the	conflict	over	judicial	reforms	affecting
Polish	politics?
Controversy	surrounding	the	Polish	government’s	judicial	reform	programme	has	undermined	its
strategy	of	pivoting	to	the	centre	in	the	run-up	to	the	country’s	next	parliamentary	and	presidential
elections.	But	as	Aleks	Szczerbiak	writes,	in	spite	of	misgivings	about	the	reforms,	the	ruling	party	is	in
tune	with	Poles	on	the	social	and	economic	issues	they	care	most	about,	and	the	opposition	has	so	far
offered	little	alternative	beyond	the	defence	of	an	unpopular	judicial	status	quo.
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There	are	three	key	elements	to	the	judicial	reform	programme	introduced	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)
party,	Poland’s	governing	party	since	autumn	2015.	Firstly,	ending	the	terms	of	office	of	the	majority	of	the	National
Judicial	Council	(KRS),	a	body	that	selects	judges	and	decides	how	the	courts	are	run,	and	selecting	their
successors	by	a	qualified	three-fifths	parliamentary	supermajority	rather	than	the	legal	profession	as	had	previously
been	the	case.	Secondly,	giving	the	justice	minister	broad	powers	to	replace	the	heads	of	lower	courts.	Thirdly,
lowering	the	retirement	age	for	supreme	court	judges	from	70	to	65,	except	for	those	re-instated	by	Law	and	Justice-
backed	President	Andrzej	Duda	based	on	recommendations	from	the	National	Judicial	Council.
Most	of	the	opposition	–	led	by	the	liberal-centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	the	country’s	governing	party	between	2007-
15	–	and	the	legal	establishment	strongly	criticised	the	reforms,	arguing	that	they	undermined	the	independence	of
the	courts	and	infringed	the	key	democratic	principle	of	constitutional	separation	of	powers.	Warning	of	a	drift
towards	authoritarian	rule,	the	government’s	opponents	said	that,	by	putting	judicial	appointments	under	political
control,	these	reforms	allowed	Law	and	Justice	to	pack	the	courts	with	its	own,	hand-picked	nominees;	pointing	out
that	the	supreme	court	rules	on	the	validity	of	national	election	and	referendum	results.
The	judicial	reforms	were	also	heavily	criticised	by	the	EU	political	establishment	and	Western	opinion-forming
media,	with	whom	the	opposition	enjoys	close	links	and	many	of	whom	share	their	dislike	of	Law	and	Justice.	The
European	Commission	has	been	involved	in	an	ongoing	‘rule	of	law’	dispute	with	the	Law	and	Justice	government
since	January	2016,	initially	over	the	membership	and	functioning	of	the	country’s	constitutional	tribunal.	At	the	end
of	last	year,	in	a	major	escalation	of	the	conflict,	in	response	to	the	judicial	reforms	the	Commission	initiated	an
action	against	Poland	under	Article	7	of	the	European	treaties	which	it	can	invoke	against	EU	member	states	where	it
feels	there	is	a	‘systemic	threat’	to	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law;	threatening	Warsaw	with	sanctions,	including
possibly	suspending	its	European	Council	voting	rights.
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The	government’s	supporters,	on	the	other	hand,	argued	that	the	reforms	were	in	line	with	the	Constitution	and
sorely	needed	because	Polish	courts	were	too	slow,	deeply	inefficient	and	tolerated	frequent	irregularities	and
corrupt	practices.	Overhauling	the	courts	is	one	of	the	most	important	elements	of	Law	and	Justice’s	programme
because	the	party	believes	that,	following	the	country’s	flawed	transition	to	democracy	in	1989,	the	judiciary,	like
many	key	Polish	institutions,	was	expropriated	by	an	extremely	well-entrenched,	and	often	deeply	corrupt,	post-
communist	elite,	which	then	co-opted	a	new	legal	establishment	that	perpetuated	its	legacy.	The	judicial	elite,	they
said,	viewed	itself	as	a	superior	‘special	caste’	out	of	touch	with	ordinary	citizens,	and	operated	as	a	‘state	within	a
state’	incapable	of	reforming	itself.	In	these	circumstances,	they	argued,	making	judges	and	their	supervisory	bodies
more	accountable	to	elected	bodies	was	justifiable	and	in	line	with	practices	in	other	established	democracies.
Conflict	over	supreme	court	retirements
The	new	supreme	court	early	retirement	provisions,	which	came	into	effect	at	midnight	on	4	July	and	affected	27	of
its	73	members,	have	proved	particular	contentious.	Nine	of	these	justices	requested	an	extension	to	their	terms	of
office	and	submitted	the	required	formal	documentation	to	the	President,	four	did	so	by	simply	stating	that	they	could
not	be	dismissed,	and	a	further	three	cited	the	provisions	of	the	Constitution.	There	were	11	supreme	court	justices
who	did	not	seek	an	extension,	including	first	president	Małgorzata	Gersdorf	who	argued	that	her	six-year	term	of
office,	which	ends	in	2020,	could	not	be	shortened	because	it	was	constitutionally	guaranteed.
The	government	and	Duda	responded	that	the	Constitution	also	says	that	parliament	determines	the	retirement	age
of	supreme	court	judges	and,	as	she	did	not	submit	a	request	to	prolong	her	term,	Gersdorf	officially	retired	and
could	not	continue	as	first	president.	They	also	said	that	one	of	her	deputies,	Józef	Iwulski,	was	acting	president	until
the	post	could	be	filled	permanently.	Gersdorf,	on	the	other	hand,	argued	that	Iwulski	was	merely	deputising	for	her
as	a	temporary	replacement	in	cases	of	her	absence;	she	went	on	vacation	shortly	after	the	new	provisions	came
into	effect	(Iwulski	shared	this	interpretation	of	his	role).
At	the	same	time,	the	European	Commission	launched	the	first	stage	of	a	legal	action	against	Poland,	arguing	that
the	new	early	retirement	provisions	threatened	the	principle	of	judicial	independence	enshrined	in	the	EU’s	charter	of
fundamental	rights,	giving	Warsaw	one	month	to	respond.	The	case	could	end	up	in	an	infringement	procedure
against	Poland	before	the	European	Court	of	Justice;	which	could,	in	turn,	issue	an	injunction	ordering	Warsaw	to
suspend	the	supreme	court	judge	replacement	process	until	it	has	determined	its	verdict.
Law	and	Justice	responded	by	introducing	legislation	to	accelerate	the	process	of	appointing	a	new,	permanent
supreme	court	head.	The	amendments,	approved	swiftly	by	parliament	(without	proper	debate,	according	to	the
opposition),	make	it	easier	to	appoint	new	supreme	court	judges	and	reduced	(from	110	to	80)	the	number	required
in	the	court’s	general	assembly	to	nominate	candidates	from	which	Duda	will	choose	the	new	first	president.	The
government	said	that	the	amendments	were	needed	to	end	the	state	of	uncertainty	in	the	supreme	court	and	prevent
the	threat	of	obstruction	of	new	appointments.	However,	some	commentators	argued	that	Law	and	Justice	wants	the
new	supreme	court	judges	and	leadership	to	be	in	place	as	soon	as	possible	to	make	the	judicial	reforms	irreversible
by	the	time	the	European	Court	of	Justice	comes	to	examine	the	case.
Undermining	Law	and	Justice’s	pivot	to	the	centre
Law	and	Justice	argues	that	it	was	elected	to	office	with	a	mandate	to	overhaul	the	judiciary.	For	sure,	an	August
2017	survey	conducted	by	the	CBOS	agency	found	that	81%	of	respondents	(including	74%	of	Civic	Platform	voters)
felt	that	judicial	reform	was	necessary	while	only	10%	were	against.
However,	while	Poles	certainly	have	many	misgivings	about	the	functioning	of	their	country’s	judicial	system,	they	are
also	wary	of	the	government’s	specific	reforms.	For	example,	a	July	survey	conducted	by	the	IBRiS	agency	for	the
‘Rzeczpospolita’	newspaper	found	that	54%	of	respondents	evaluated	them	negatively	and	only	39%	positively.	Only
18%	said	they	would	increase	trust	in	Polish	courts	(25%	reduce	trust,	15%	make	no	difference);	25%	that	they
would	increase	the	independence	of	the	courts	(48%	reduce	independence,	14%	no	difference);	and	28%	said	they
would	make	them	more	efficient	(43%	reduce	efficiency,	14%	no	difference).
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Moreover,	some	commentators	argue	that,	by	polarising	the	political	scene	around	such	a	sharp	conflict,	the	judicial
reform	controversy	has	undermined	Law	and	Justice’s	strategic	objective	of	calming	social	protests	and	shifting	the
focus	of	debate	in	the	second	half	of	the	government’s	parliamentary	term	away	from	more	controversial	issues	to
broaden	the	ruling	party’s	appeal	to	more	centrist	voters.	With	the	passage	of	the	judicial	reform	laws	at	the	end	of
last	year,	many	of	the	key	elements	of	the	government’s	radical	state	re-construction	programme	were	felt	to	be	in
place.	One	of	the	main	objectives	of	the	change	of	prime	minister	last	December	and	government	reshuffle	in
January	was,	therefore,	to	stabilise	and	consolidate	Law	and	Justice’s	position	ahead	of	a	series	of	key	elections:
local	government	in	the	autumn,	European	Parliament	in	May	2019,	parliamentary	in	autumn	2019,	culminating	in	the
summer	2020	presidential	poll.
Why	no	backlash?
Nonetheless,	opinion	poll	support	for	Law	and	Justice	is	holding	up	well,	averaging	around	40%,	roughly	the	level
that	the	party	achieved	in	the	2015	parliamentary	election	and	at	least	10	percentage	points	ahead	of	Civic	Platform.
At	the	same	time,	protests	against	the	government’s	judicial	reforms	–	which	last	year	were	held	in	dozens	of	towns
and	cities	and	attracted	thousands	of	Poles	–	were	much	smaller	this	time	around	and	appeared	to	mobilise	a	less
diverse	cross-section	of	the	public,	with	notably	fewer	young	people	involved.
So	why	has	there	not	been	more	of	a	political	backlash	against	the	government’s	reforms?	Although	many	Poles
have	misgivings	about	Law	and	Justice’s	approach	to	constitutional	questions,	they	also	find	these	kinds	of	issues
rather	abstract.	For	sure,	the	July	IBRiS/’Rzeczpospolita’	survey	found	that	70%	of	respondents	said	that	they	were
interested	in	the	supreme	court	reforms	(33%	very	interested)	and	63%	that	they	‘affected	them	directly’	(31%	to	a
significant	extent).	However,	it	is	questionable	whether	they	have	detailed	knowledge	of	the	dispute,	and	they	often
tend	to	view	it	as	a	political	conflict	rather	than	through	a	legal-constitutional	lens.
Indeed,	the	opposition	have	not	been	able	to	convince	ordinary	Poles	that	anything	really	extraordinary	is	happening
in	the	country	as	far	as	the	state	of	democracy	is	concerned	because	their	rhetoric	often	does	not	accord	with	the
latter’s	everyday	experiences.	For	many	Poles,	for	example,	the	anti-Law	and	Justice	privately-owned	media	still
appears	to	provide	a	powerful	counter-weight	to	pro-government	public	broadcasting.	At	the	same	time,	Law	and
Justice	is	more	in	tune	with	public	opinion,	and	appears	to	have	delivered	on	the	social	and	economic	issues	which
Poles	care	most	about.
Moreover,	although	they	are	not	necessarily	convinced	by	the	government’s	reforms,	most	Poles	are	very	critical	of
the	way	that	the	courts	currently	function	so	the	judicial	establishment	does	not	have	a	bank	of	goodwill	that	the
opposition	can	draw	on	to	mobilise	support.	For	example,	a	February	2017	CBOS	survey	found	that	51%	of
respondents	said	that	they	evaluated	the	Polish	judicial	system	negatively	compared	with	36%	who	viewed	it
positively	(only	2%	very	positively).	Among	the	most	commonly	cited	problems	were:	the	protracted	nature	of	trials
(48%),	court	proceedings	being	too	complicated	(33%),	and	judicial	corruption	(30%).
Moreover,	while	focusing	on	Gersdorf	as	the	visible	symbol	of	resistance	to	the	reforms	gave	the	opposition	an
opportunity	to	‘personalise’	the	dispute	in	a	way	that	could	make	it	intelligible	for	Poles	unfamiliar	with	the	intricacies
of	how	the	supreme	court	works,	she	does	not	have	the	personality	of	a	‘political	fighter’.	Indeed,	her	often-
inconsistent	behaviour	–	declaring	that	she	would	not	comply	with	the	new	law	but	then	going	on	holiday	at	a	crucial
moment	during	the	anti-reform	protests	–	confused	and	demobilised	the	government’s	opponents.	At	the	same	time,
Law	and	Justice’s	argument	that	the	reforms	were	aimed	at	freeing	the	court	system	from	the	country’s	non-
democratic	past	were	reinforced	when	it	emerged	that	Iwulski	had	participated	in	seven	political	trials	involving
sixteen	anti-regime	oppositionists	and	was	a	reserve	officer	of	the	military	counter-intelligence	service	(WSW)	during
the	communist	period.
Flawed	reforms	better	than	the	status	quo?
Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	opposition	has	not	really	offered	any	credible	alternative	to	the	government’s	judicial
reforms	other	than	defending	a	status	quo	that	most	Poles	feel	is	deeply	flawed.	An	August	2017	CBOS	survey,	for
example,	found	that	while	only	23%	of	respondents	trusted	Law	and	Justice	on	this	issue	(64%	distrusted)	only	6%
trusted	Civic	Platform	(79%	distrusted).	Even	if	Poles	are	dubious	as	to	whether	the	government’s	reforms	will
significantly	improve	the	functioning	of	the	judicial	system,	Law	and	Justice	has	been	effective	at	convincing	many	of
them	that,	for	all	its	faults,	that	it	is	at	least	trying	to	tackle	a	problem	which	previous	administrations	appeared
content	to	ignore.
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Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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